Vedanānupassanā
[139] After the Blessed One had spoken on kāyānupassanā (the mindfulness-of-body section of the Satipaṭṭhāna) in the fourteen ways as described, now—so as to instruct on vedanānupassanā by nine ways—He spoke the introductory phrase, “Thus have I heard, bhikkhus.”
Knowledge that is not satipaṭṭhāna-practice
In those passages the phrase “feeling of pleasure” (sukhaṁ vedanā) is explained as follows: when the meditator experiences a pleasant feeling that belongs to the body or that belongs to the mind, he knows clearly: “We (or: one) are experiencing a pleasant feeling.” In that respect even an infant lying on its back, when it enjoys the pleasure of being fed oil, knows clearly: “I am experiencing pleasure.” Yet the Blessed One did not mean that sort of knowing here — for that kind of knowing cannot remove the “I-making” (satta-upaladdhi), cannot uproot the self-sense (satta-saññā), and is not a kammaṭṭhāna nor a satipaṭṭhāna practice.
Knowledge that is satipaṭṭhāna-practice
But the knowing of the bhikkhu that does uproot the I-making, that does remove the self-sense, that is a proper kammaṭṭhāna and a satipaṭṭhāna-practice — that is the kind of knowing the Blessed One intends when he says that one “experiences (is experiencing) a feeling.” That is: who experiences? whose experiencing is it? for what reason is it experienced?
Those passages explain the phrase “who experiences?” (ko veyyati) to mean: not that some “someone” (a being or person) experiences. The phrase “the experiencing of whom?” (kassa vedanā?) means: it is not the experiencing of anyone (not the experiencing of a being or person). The phrase “for what reason is it experienced?” (kiṁkāraṇaṁ vedanā?) means: because an object has become the sense-adjacent object (i.e., has been taken as object), therefore there is experiencing.
Thus the meditator knows clearly in this way: that feeling itself experiences by virtue of making the object an object of mind. But because the passage intends to point to the way feelings occur, the phrase “I experience the feeling” (ahaṁ vedayāmi) is merely a conventional utterance.
Practical understanding and the exemplar-story
When the meditator notes in this manner — that the feeling itself experiences by virtue of turning the object into an object — the student should understand that he knows clearly: “We are experiencing a pleasant feeling.” Like the story of a certain elder who, though ill, was inwardly established in mindfulness:
(It is told of a certain elder:) It was heard that an elder, while unwell, would sigh and toss about. A young bhikkhu asked him: “Sir, where specifically does the pain stab you?” The elder answered: “Friend, the place of stabbing is nowhere specific; there is simply the feeling experiencing itself, caused by having the object as an object.” The young bhikkhu said: “Then you should suppress it at the time you know it, should you not?” The elder replied: “I am suppressing it, friend.” The young bhikkhu said: “That restraining is excellent.” The elder restrained it. Then a wind of pain reached the heart; the large intestine expelled itself upon the bed. The elder showed the young bhikkhu and said: “Is such restraint enough now, friend?” The young monk was silent. The elder practiced steadily and then attained arahantship with analytical knowledges (paṭisamphidā) — an arahant who passed away with life fully present.
Thus when the meditator knows clearly how pleasure is, how pain is, etc., and when one experiences ākusala-free anukampa (i.e., the “not-sensual” form of the painful-pleasant-neutral triad — here: the non-sensual form of aduḥkha-sukha), he knows clearly: “I am experiencing the non-sensual (non-material) unpleasant-pleasant feeling.”
— End of passage —
Short Pāli Glossary (concise · intensive)
- vedanā — “feeling” / affective tone: the hedonic quality of an experience (pleasant sukha, painful dukkha, or neutral adukkhamasukhā / neither-pleasant-nor-painful). In early texts vedanā is an immediate, phenomenological register, distinct from perception (saññā) and mental formations (saṅkhāra).
- vedanānupassanā — “contemplation of feelings”: the satipaṭṭhāna practice that contemplates feelings as they arise and pass away, discriminating them as conditioned processes (how they arise, abide, and cease) rather than as owned by an enduring self.
- kāyānupassanā — “body-contemplation (part of Satipaṭṭhāna)”: here the text notes it was taught earlier in fourteen ways; vedanānupassanā is now taken up after that.
- sati / satipaṭṭhāna — mindfulness / the establishments of mindfulness: clear present recollection and contemplative presence; when described as a “practice” it points to systematic, discerning observation (not mere ordinary noticing).
- kammaṭṭhāna — “place of work/practice” (meditation-work): in this context it means a proper meditative method or object that is soteriologically effective; the text distinguishes ordinary knowing from kammaṭṭhāna-quality knowing.
- satta-upaladdhi / satta-saññā — (literally “grasping of being” / “being-sense”): the cognitive-tendency to reify an experience as ‘a being’ or to take phenomena as owned by an enduring self; the passage emphasizes that ordinary, naive awareness cannot uproot these.
- ahaṁ vedayāmi — conventional expression “I experience (a feeling)”: the Sutta notes such first-person locutions are conventional speech about the fact of occurrence, not ontological claims — the contemplative task is to discern the process itself, not to reify an experiencer.
- ko veyyati? kassa vedanā? kiṁkāraṇaṁ? — Pāli interrogatives from the passage: “Who experiences?” / “Of whom is the feeling experienced?” / “By what cause is it experienced?” — used to de-personalize the event and show the conditioned nature of feeling.
- paṭisamphidā / analytical knowledges — the knowledges of analytical penetration that can arise in deep practice leading to arahantship; in the story the elder attains arahantship “with paṭisamphidā.”